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This paper discusses the strategies available to multinational pharmaceutical companies 
(MPCs) to expand their activities in Brazil through the national drugs policy. MPCs have 
existed in Brazil for decades, but they are increasing their focus on emerging markets as 
growth in developed markets slows. Despite the potential for market expansion, this paper 
considers the political factors that could promote or constrain their strategy. Since the 
1990s, Brazil’s national framework on healthcare and more specifically pharmaceuticals has 
shifted considerably. On the domestic front, Brazil has created a public health system, 
introduced regulation on patents and established a thriving generics sector, while it has 
become more pro-active internationally, as highlighted by the AIDS epidemic. This paper 
argues that MPCs should respond to the political changes in Brazil and the global industry-
specific pressures by adapting corporate strategies to the local context rather than a one-





MPCs are facing an unprecedented crisis as their business model appears unable to sustain 
billion-dollar sales from “blockbuster” drugs.  Companies need to expand in fast-growing, 
emerging markets to offset declining return of investment in developed markets, as they 
face patent expiries of blockbusters, increased generic competition and a dearth in 
innovation. For example, US-based Pfizer, the world’s biggest pharmaceutical company, will 
suffer substantial losses when its best-selling drug Lipitor (atorvastatin), which accounts for 
about a third of the company’s total revenues, loses patent protection around 2012. As the 
second biggest emerging pharmaceutical market after China and among the world’s top 10, 
Brazil offers huge potential for MPCs to expand.  
 
IMS Health, a healthcare consultancy, predicts that the Brazilian pharmaceutical market will 
grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 7-10% from 2008-2013. By contrast, the 
US is likely to experience negative 1-2% growth and the top five European countries just 2-
3% growth (IMS, 2009). Many MPCs are well established in Brazil, but only recently did they 
explicitly announce their intention to develop their domestic base, motivated primarily by 
commercial reasons. However, MPCs must consider the wider social, economic and political 
realities of Brazil and look beyond the commercial potential because pharmaceuticals are 
more than mere commodities. The pharmaceutical industry plays an important social and 
economic role in society by improving public health and developing a “knowledge and skills-
based” economy geared towards research, innovation and competitiveness 




From a socio-economic perspective, the scope for expansion is vast. Brazil’s sheer size, in 
terms of geography and with a population of almost 200 million, means that there are many 
unmet medical needs. Despite being a rising middle-income power, Brazil suffers from huge 
inequalities in the distribution of wealth, resulting in persistent poverty and huge regional 
disparities. In 2004, the lowest 10% of the population in terms of income received only a 
0.5% share of Brazil’s wealth. By contrast, the highest 10% of wage earners received 46.7%, 
compared with 27.4% in India, 33.1% in China, 36% in the Russian Federation and 29.9% in 
the US (World Bank, 2004:60). This skewed distribution of wealth directly affects access to 
and the ability to pay for pharmaceuticals, including basic treatments. Around 80% of the 
population pays for medicines out of their own pocket (Madrid and Fefer, 1998), with the 
poor spending a disproportionate amount of their income on pharmaceuticals compared 
with the middle and upper classes.   
 
The Brazilian government is becoming an influential player in the pharmaceutical sector as it 
seeks to improve equity and efficiency within the healthcare and pharmaceutical system. It 
has been making concerted efforts to develop the domestic pharmaceutical industry, by 
investing in public laboratories, in an attempt to manufacture cheaper medicines and to 
reduce its dependence on drug imports. As Gereffi (1983:167) says, the pharmaceutical 
industry already operates in a highly politicised environment. However, the emergence of 
an activist state is threatening MPCs’ political dominance as the balance of power shifts 
within the sector. If the state appears to be moving away from MPCs to pursue a divergent 
pharmaceutical strategy, how can they participate within this new framework?  
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Much of the literature on MPC expansion concentrates on market opportunities, while 
political studies tend to focus on opportunities for the government to increase its role in the 
pharmaceutical sector, particularly through its AIDS policy. This paper seeks to bridge this 
gap by exploring MPC expansion within the context of Brazil’s pharmaceutical framework, 
with reference to its AIDS policy but not as the main focus. The politics surrounding access 
to medicines and the merits or disadvantages of intellectual property legislation are beyond 
the scope of this paper. Its main purpose is to examine the politics surrounding MPCs in 
Brazil in relation to the global pressures they currently face.   
 
This study argues that there is enormous scope for MPCs to participate in the Brazilian 
pharmaceutical market through this framework if they adapt their corporate strategy 
accordingly. Among the changes needed are: differentiation through innovation and brand 
promotion; increased focus on mergers and acquisitions and partnerships, and on providing 
treatment in under-served areas; appropriate pricing policies to facilitate consumer access; 
and a commitment to work with regulations, to adapt to the needs of the population, and to 
improve the industry’s image in developing countries. Many companies in Brazil and other 
emerging markets such as China and India are becoming MPCs in their own right, with many 
Indian companies entering Brazil, for example. However, this study will focus on companies 
headquartered in Europe and the US that have been present in Brazil for several years as 




The study is divided into three sections. The first chapter examines the development of 
Brazil’s national drugs’ policy in the context of democratisation and healthcare reform. The 
transition to democracy in 1988 and the creation of a new constitution, in which access to 
healthcare was declared a universal right, spurred on transformational changes to Brazil’s 
healthcare policy. This chapter analyses the politics of healthcare reform through 
universalism and decentralisation, and its effects on the development of pharmaceutical 
policy.   
 
This sets the context of policies affecting the evolution of the pharmaceutical market in 
Brazil, which is the focus of the second chapter. While the 1980s and early 1990s focused on 
healthcare reform, the mid to late 1990s heralded a shift in pharmaceutical policy. Brazil 
introduced TRIPS, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, international legislation which obliges countries to 
enforce patents on pharmaceutical products. At the same time, the government authorised 
the creation of a generics industry to provide cheaper, off-patent versions of essential 
medicines and create more competition within the sector. 
 
Against this backdrop, the third chapter examines the politics of MPCs and the avenues for 
their participation in the Brazilian market through policies of co-operation and 
differentiation. It will examine arguments made by domestic pharmaceutical companies 




This study draws on a wide range of primary and secondary data. The primary material, 
gained during a two-week field trip, comprises interviews with key stakeholders 
representing different segments of the Brazilian industry. These include MPCs, industry 
associations representing MPCs and domestic pharmaceutical companies, and experts from 
the Brazilian drugs regulator. The interviews are complemented with a variety of additional 
material including company presentations, reports and press releases. The study also draws 
upon press reports as an additional means of supporting or criticising a particular policy, 




Chapter 1  
 
Brazil’s national drugs’ policy (NDP) was instrumental in extending the founding principles of 
the national public health system, free and universal access, to pharmaceuticals. The 
Brazilian health system, the SUS (Sistema Único de Saúde), was conceived in 1988 based on 
the philosophy of an integrated healthcare system provided by the state. This was a 
deliberate attempt to fundamentally reform a frail and inefficient infrastructure, 
underpinned by Brazil’s return to democracy. The right to free pharmaceuticals was implicit, 
but it was the NDP, issued 10 years later, that assured the free provision of essential drugs 
through the SUS.  
 
Despite the establishment of the NDP, access to drugs remains a continual challenge, 
particularly in poor states where many people lack even basic treatments. While household 
expenditure on items such as food and clothing fell between 1987/88 and 1995/96, 
spending on health rose from 5.3% to 6.5%. Of this, medications and medical supplies were 
the single biggest expense for poor families. Although spending on drugs fell during the 
period, it still accounted for 59% of total health expenditure for a family with up to two 
minimum wages, compared with 19.4% for a family with incomes of more than 30 minimum 
wages (Medici, 2003:4, 8). Notwithstanding, the NDP has transformed the nature of drugs 
provision and public health in Brazil from clinical care and prevention to “medicamentation” 
(Biehl, 2004:113). This was only made possible by fundamental shifts in the concept of 
healthcare and broader political changes.    
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This chapter will examine the NDP as an integral part of healthcare reform because the 
pharmaceutical framework developed within this context. It will consider the NDP not only 
as an instrument for advancing health policy in Brazil, but also for achieving the goals of 
democratisation and societal reform.  
 
Before we can analyse the NDP we first have to understand healthcare reform in its own 
right. Healthcare reform in Brazil occurred amid economic turmoil, provoked by the region-
wide debt crisis, and democratisation. The country’s transition to democracy was a gradual 
and uneven process, but was characterised by the emergence of an extensive civil society 
mobilised around citizenship. The concept went well beyond the political meaning of 
citizenship to include social and economic rights (Friedman and Hochstetler, 2002:31). The 
high level of state-society institutionalisation and consolidation of democracy was to set the 
scene for a different type of healthcare system in the region.  
 
Most Latin American countries embarked on healthcare reforms based on neoliberal 
economic policies to reduce the cost of healthcare services and increase efficiency to 
overcome the economic crisis. By contrast, Brazil sought to achieve free universal coverage 
through a supply-side public system (Medici, 2002:1). This policy aimed to make a financially 
and organisationally weak system more effective and efficient, and help consolidate 
democracy; sometimes two conflicting goals. The proposal was unique in the region because 
it was an answer to a political crisis in the authoritarian regime rather than to the economic 
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crisis and structural adjustment policies; the motivation was political and ideological (Fleury, 
2000:8).  
 
Brazil’s 1988 constitution established health as a basic citizen right and required that the 
state provide universal and equal access to health services through a unified healthcare 
system. It institutionalised the reforms, laying the foundation for a more equitable and 
efficient health system, with an emphasis on services for the local community, known as 
primary care. Healthcare provision under the former military regime had been uneven and 
the reserved of a minority, reflecting the broader antidemocratic nature of society. It was 
insurance-based, highly centralised, based predominantly on specialised, hospital-based 
care (secondary care) and provided as part of social security. This meant that only workers 
in the formal employment sector benefited from medical care. Consequently, the social 
security system grew politically and financially at the expense of public health and primary 
care (Lobato and Burlandy, 2000:9).   
 
The reforms brought the health sector under the co-ordination of the Brazilian ministry of 
health (MoH) and integrated it with social security, a measure that transformed financing of 
the system. Funding came through taxes, social contributions by companies, and 
contributions from employees and employers. The constitution created a single 
administration for the public system, with a supplementary private system (SPS) where 
services could be contracted to the private sector, the “public contract model”. Londoño 
and Frenk (2000:32) say it creates more options for the population and greater 
15 
 
opportunities for autonomy and competition for providers, who are paid according to 
productivity and quality of service provided. However, the lack of an “explicit articulation 
function” can lead to financing deficits and fragmented delivery of services, making the 
control of costs and quality extremely problematic.  
 
The unified system provided integrated care based on the epidemiological profile of the 
population, and guaranteed universal access to all levels of care. Civil society had an 
important role in governance, and funding and healthcare provision was decentralised to 
states and municipalities, enabling greater social and political participation. Decentralisation 
was part of a broader political, fiscal and administrative process that had been occurring in 
Brazil under military rule but which gained momentum during the democratisation process. 
The constitution accelerated the process of municipalisation by transferring more funding 
and responsibilities to local governments. Municipalities gained legal status as federal 
entities, giving them autonomy in the organisation of healthcare services, with technical and 
financial assistance from the states and federal government (Samuels, 2004:90).   
 
The municipalities have strengthened the provision of primary care services through 
programmes such as Basic Assistance Floor and Family Healthcare Programme (PSF). The 
PSF was a policy rather than a programme set up in 1994 to change healthcare delivery by 
creating interdisciplinary teams in healthcare units to increase basic health coverage. These 
units operate in specific geographic areas and engage in the promotion, prevention, 
treatment, and rehabilitation of the more common diseases and health problems. The PSF 
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started in the poorest areas but has expanded rapidly across Brazil and to areas of varied 
income (Cohn, 2008:77). Gómez (2008:62) argues that the government may have 
decentralised funding, but failed to develop procedures on how and when states should 
provide transfers. This has created tension between states and municipalities, imbalances in 
administrative and technical capacity and uncertainty about funding. Moreover, in practice 
healthcare provision is still centrally funded with federal government accounting for the 
majority of public health expenditure.   
 
Total health expenditure rose from 7.9% to 8.5% of GDP from 1990-2002; however, the 
public share was stagnant during this period, while the private share expanded consistently 
(Mesa-Logo, 2007:193). In reality, the private sector still remains an important source of 
healthcare provision. Although higher earners can afford private health insurance, poor 
families also rely on the private segment because health authorities are still failing to target 
lower-income populations. In 1998, 48% of people classed as higher education graduate did 
not use the SUS; however, 12% of those with incomplete elementary schooling also did not 
use the service (Arretche, 2004:181). As Dr Caio Netto (2009) says, Brazil has very good 
doctors but it is a big country, making it difficult to give free assistance to everyone.  
 
Drugs are one area where free and universal access can help reduce poverty substantially, 
but they are often overlooked in reform policies. This began to change in the 1990s 
following the World Bank’s influential Development Report 1993: Investing in Health 
(1993:12). The report stated that in the short term, reforms in pharmaceutical usage offered 
the greatest efficiency gains for developing countries’ health systems. It recommended that 
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countries draw up national essential drugs lists containing inexpensive, generic medicines to 
reduce procurement costs of drugs for the public sector. Therefore, as a crucial component 
of healthcare, it seemed only logical that pharmaceutical services would be restructured in 
line with the healthcare reforms. However, pharmaceutical reform in Brazil occurred only 
after political and social forces pushed the issue to the forefront of the political agenda, 
most notably during the AIDS epidemic.    
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, NGOs and civil society mobilised around a public policy for 
the poor to demand that the state provide access to prevention and treatment services for 
AIDS. NGOs framed the discourse as discrimination and a violation of human and citizenship 
rights (Nunn, 2009:133). In 1990, the MoH committed itself to providing AIDS treatment and 
began producing generic antiretrovirals (ARVs) in 1993. Three years later, Congress passed 
Law 9.313, making Brazil the first country to guarantee free and universal treatment to all 
HIV/AIDS sufferers in the country. Brazil’s AIDS policy marked a turning point as it began to 
develop a comprehensive pharmaceutical policy based on the principles of universality and 
equality.  
 
The politicisation of AIDS showed the need for a pharmaceutical framework that could 
respond adequately to the epidemiological profile of the population. Brazil faces a complex 
disease situation, characterised by chronic conditions found in developed countries and a 
persistence of diseases associated with poverty and social inequality. In 2005, high blood 
pressure (20% of all deaths), high cholesterol (11%), tobacco (7.6%) and obesity (6.5%) were 
18 
 
the main causes of death in Brazil (Abegunde et al, 2007:1933). At the same time, it is 
estimated that most of the neglected tropical disease burden in Latin America now occurs in 
Brazil. This includes virtually all of the cases of blinding trachoma and leprosy, and the 
majority of ascariasis, dengue, hookworm infection, schistosomiasis, and visceral 
leishmaniasis (Hotez, 2008).    
 
In 1998, Brazil established the NDP, the first drug policy consistent with the World Health 
Organization (WHO)’s guidelines on essential drugs. The NDP included proposals on 
guaranteeing safety, effectiveness and quality of drugs, promoting rational use and 
universal access to essential medicines, re-orientating pharmaceutical services and 
promoting scientific and technological development. In alignment with WHO guidelines, 
Brazil established the National List of Essential Medicines (Relação Nacional de 
Medicamentos Essenciais - RENAME). The latest version, updated in 2008 (MoH, 2008), 
includes 552 formulations of 342 drugs, and focuses on drugs for the central nervous 
system, cardiovascular disease and blood conditions.  
 
Responsibility for administering basic medicines programmes has been decentralised to the 
states and municipalities. The federal government finances R$1 on a per capita basis and the 
states and municipalities finance at least R$1 together. Federal government spending on 
basic medicines rose considerably from R$45 million in 1998 to R$160 million in 1999 
(Cohen, 2000:16). However, a study on 61 essential drugs in primary care centres in 11 cities 
found that none of the drugs was fully available, with a fifth of drugs out of stock in all the 
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centres visited in Brasília, Macapá and Porto Velho (Karnikowski et al, 2004:291). This 
indicates insufficient funding and a lack of co-ordination in administering the programmes, 
mirroring the larger problems associated with decentralising healthcare policies. According 
to Cohen (2000:17), most local governments lack the human and institutional capacity to 
manage the procurement and distribution of pharmaceuticals effectively.  
 
However, responsibility for financing and distribution of drugs for diseases such as AIDS, 
diabetes, tuberculosis and leprosy remains with the federal government; there is also a 
RENAME for exceptional/high-cost medicines. In recent years, more and more patients have 
taken health authorities to court to secure their rights to medicines. Patients can claim for 
medicines not on the list of essential medicines and for new drugs that have yet to be 
approved for reimbursement. The judicialisation of healthcare in Brazil stems from the right 
to healthcare as advocated in the constitution and essentially holds the government 
accountable for providing these services.     
 
A study of 170 cases brought against the municipal government of São Paulo found that 62% 
of drugs appeared on the SUS lists, suggesting that municipalities are failing to observe the 
NDP. At the same time it reduces resources for drug purchasing because the state is obliged 
to pay for the medicines being demanded (Vieria and Zucchi, 2007:2-6). On the other hand, 
some cases can have a beneficial effect if it makes a medicine more widely available. For 
example, in 2000 there was a rise in the number of cases demanding exceptional medicines 
such as mesalazine, for ulcerative colitis, peg-interferon for hepatitis C and infliximab, for 
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autoimmune diseases. Consequently, in 2002, the state of Rio de Janeiro added these 
medicines to its list of essential medicines for exceptionals (Messeder et al, 2005:532).  
 
The explicit right to healthcare does not mean that the patient will automatically be 
awarded a medicine. However, the judicialisation of healthcare raises questions about the 
role of courts in determining healthcare policy. Successful litigation, in the narrow sense of 
winning in court, may not necessarily improve a patient’s health or that of the wider 
population. By contrast, a loss in court may benefit society in the long term by providing an 
effective focal point for social mobilisation and advocacy (Gloppen, 2008:25). Healthcare 
litigation in Brazil is an example of legal mobilisation where individuals or groups are 
pushing for new rights, rights that are not yet recognised to become legal. The 1988 
constitution raised expectations that its provisions would be upheld, especially because the 
constitution itself was a result of widespread consultation (Sieder et al, 2005:4).       
 
The NDP is far from perfect, with further room for improvement in funding, efficiencies and 
defining policy. However, as a concept, the NDP was truly historic. For the first time, 
treatment became more aligned to health needs and the medical needs of a population 
became an integral part of wider social and human rights. The NDP might have started out 
on as a political tool but it soon became a healthcare policy in its own right. Public 
expenditure on pharmaceuticals has grown according to the government’s commitment to 
healthcare, rising from R$1.93 billion in 2002, 5.8% of total health spending, to R$4.14 
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billion in 2006, representing 11.2% of the health budget (Opas, 2008). Pharmaceuticals are 




Chapter 2  
 
Brazil’s pharmaceutical market has undergone dramatic changes in the past 10 years as the 
government strives to fulfil its commitment to the NDP. The NDP was influential in 
increasing the government’s involvement in the sector, not only as service provider but also 
as a producer of low-cost medicines, following the creation of a generics segment. However, 
the international pharmaceutical industry also played an important role in shaping the 
Brazilian market, strengthened by the introduction of patent legislation on pharmaceuticals. 
The relationship between patented medicines and generics was to have a profound 
influence on the balance of power as well as specific policies within Brazil’s pharmaceutical 
market.   
 
This chapter will analyse the importance of domestic policies and international factors in the 
development of Brazil’s pharmaceutical market. This conjunction is key to understanding 
not only the nature of the market, but also the role of the actors that determined the 
development path. Unlike other areas of the healthcare sector, pharmaceuticals are part of 
a market; therefore demand is conditioned by purchasing power rather than health needs 
and achieving social objectives such as equity. Moreover, pharmaceuticals are not simply 
about a set of services, but also involve goods which are traded internationally. Therefore, 





As Brazil integrates itself into a new globalised political and economic world order, where 
health and production are becoming increasingly transnationalised (Montero and Samuels, 
2004:15), it can no longer ignore demands from international actors. This is even more the 
case in an industry that operates on a global level and is dominated by multinational 
corporations. As a result, Brazil had to raise its game to comply with international trade 
standards involving pharmaceuticals. At the same time, globalisation has widened the 
access gap to medicines between developed and developing countries, prompting Brazil to 
take action to reduce this disparity (Huttin, 2002:4).  
 
Paradoxically then, TRIPS also created an opportunity for the government to become a 
strategic player in a market that can improve public health but also contribute to the 
country’s economic and social development. Civil society groups, which had successfully 
lobbied the government on AIDS, added another dimension as they turned their attention 
to TRIPS and organised against what they perceived as an infringement on citizenship rights. 
In this context, Brazil’s pharmaceutical market became a focal point for new actors looking 
to exert their influence while established players, MPCs, sought to maintain their power. To 
understand this dynamic, we first have to assess the historical nature of MPCs in Brazil and 
the environment in which they operated. 
 
MPCs started buying out local firms in Brazil in the 1950s and came to dominate the market 
by the 1970s, despite the government abolishing patent protection for pharmaceuticals in 
1969. The transnationalisation of Brazil’s pharmaceutical market occurred amid import 
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substitution industrialisation (ISI). This was a trade and economic policy that Latin America 
adopted from the 1930s onwards to reduce foreign dependency through the local 
production of industrialised products. The focus of ISI shifted away from raw materials to 
industrial sectors, such as pharmaceuticals, which require advanced technology and 
organisational skills. Dependency theory, which arose in the 1950s, sought to explain the 
rise of ISI by arguing that poor countries at the “periphery” were impoverished because 
resources flowed to a core of wealthy states.  
 
Cardoso and Faletto (1979:2) argued that the region had to base industrialisation on 
domestic markets and diversification if it were to develop and complete the development 
cycle. In 1971, the government implemented Law No. 5772 on Industrial Policy, which 
allowed local firms to develop technical skills to make copies of patented drugs via “reverse 
engineering”. The long-term goal was to enable local firms to export their products, develop 
their own research and development (R&D) capabilities and to become self-sufficient in the 
production of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) and drugs, as well as making drugs 
cheaper (Cohen, 2006:16). This policy created a category known as similars, which are 
pharmaceutically equivalent but not therapeutically equivalent to the original product, and 
therefore not the same as generics. Generics have to show bioequivalence, the same 
strength as the original drug, and bioavailability, the extent to and rate at which the drug 




Brazil was intent on developing a national pharmaceuticals industry, but multinationals 
were essential for deepening ISI in terms of providing the necessary investments, 
technology and skilled managerial organisations. The main aim of these companies was no 
longer the export of primary commodities but instead industrial production to serve the 
country’s growing internal needs (Gereffi, 1983:33, 36). Dependency theory has since been 
criticised for failing to account for the social and political aspects of development and ISI 
eventually failed. Although a discussion on dependency theory and ISI is not the focus of this 
chapter, the main point is that a national industry already existed together with MPCs 
before the 1990s. However, the introduction of TRIPS and the creation of a generics 
segment were to change the balance of this relationship.  
 
Recent studies have shown that the pharmaceutical industry places the highest importance 
on patents compared with other research-intensive industries, given the time and money 
required to discover new medicines (Grabowski, 2002:850-851). Therefore, the introduction 
of TRIPS was a landmark event for the pharmaceutical industry, creating the most 
comprehensive legal regime at the multilateral level regarding intellectual property rights 
(IPRs; Lanoszka, 2003:183). TRIPS became more pertinent in Brazil because as a member of 
the WTO, it had to abide by the rules of the international system.  
 
In 1997, Brazil implemented the Industrial Properties Law (LPI), well ahead of the 2005 
transition date, and shifted the balance of power towards patent holders. The number of 
patents filed by MPCs rose from about 500 in 1997 to more than 1,100 in 2003. By contrast, 
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the number filed by national companies increased from about 50 or so to around 100 during 
the same period (Jannuzzi et al, 2008:10). From the very outset, TRIPS was highly 
controversial. Professor Frederick Abbott, an expert on international IPRs and global 
economic issues, said at an international seminar on patents held in Rio de Janeiro this year 
that Brazil had made “a negative adjustment, with enormous damage to the national 
pharmaceutical sector”. Several MPCs are trying to extend the life of a drug as patent expiry 
draws nearer by increasing the number of patents for one product, the so-called multiple 
patents. Professor Abbott said this practice had forced developing countries such as Brazil to 
change its laws while impeding therapeutic advances [Alanac (Associação dos Laboratórios 
Farmacêuticos Nacionais), 2009].       
 
IP protection on pharmaceuticals in Brazil was more extensive than in many other 
developing countries, classified as TRIPS-plus, because it exceeded multilateral obligations. 
This meant that more drugs would be patented but it would be more difficult to launch 
alternative drugs on the market or induce competition through generics (Shadlen, 2007:9). 
For example, it disallowed parallel imports (PI), where patented medicines that are in 
circulation in one market are then imported into a second market without the authorisation 
of the local owner of the IPR. Pharmaceutical companies claim that PI substantially reduces 
their profits and in turn their ability to innovative. However, public authorities in many 
developing countries argue that PI enables them to buy drugs from the cheapest sources 
possible (Maskus, 2001:1). Even more contentious was the granting of pipeline patents, a 





Patent protection in Brazil is not retrospective and does not apply to existing innovative 
drugs already on the market before 1995, enabling local companies to make generic 
versions of these drugs. However, the pipeline clause validates patents that have never 
been filed in Brazil but have been filed and granted abroad. Pipeline patent applications are 
only subject to a formal analysis. They do not have to be submitted to the Brazilian patent 
office, the National Industry Property Institute (INPI), for technical analysis of patentability 
requirements – novelty, inventiveness and industrial application. In 2001, the LPI was 
modified by Law No. 10,196, which said that that all pending pipeline applications should be 
granted except for process patents filed between 1 January 1995 and 14 May 1997.  
 
Civil society groups and national companies contend that the pipeline provision grants 
patents to drugs that are already in the public domain and therefore severely restricts 
innovation and access to medicines (Chaves et al, 2008). Earlier this year, the attorney 
general filed a case on behalf of NGOs claiming the unconstitutionality of the pipeline 
mechanism. Interfarma, the Brazilian association of MPCs, has launched a counter challenge 
and the case is currently in the Supreme Court. This incident shows that despite the 
introduction of TRIPS, national actors can influence international policy if there is consensus 
among them and if the political will exists.  
 
Yet even with TRIPS, the granting of patents is not automatic, and does not always work in 
favour of MPCs. In June this year, the INPI rejected the patent for Gilead’s ARV Viread 
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(tenofovir), saying that it failed to fulfil the novelty and inventiveness requirements of 
granting a patent. The decision sets an important precedent, sending a warning to other 
MPCs that they cannot simply hide behind international legislation; they also have to 
comply with national requirements. Moreover, the move was an important step forward for 
domestic pharmaceutical policies in reducing the price of the most expensive drugs within 
the government’s ARV budget (Rebrip, 2009). AIDS changed the Brazilian government’s 
drugs’ policy and so too did it change the nature of IP legislation on pharmaceuticals. The 
issue not only focused the government’s attention on access to medicines, but the 
government also became more prominent in initiatives to reform national IP legislation, 
most notably through compulsory licensing. 
 
Compulsory licensing is a TRIPS flexibility that allows someone else to produce the patented 
product or process without the consent of the patent owner. In October 1999 Brazil issued a 
presidential decree that allowed compulsory licensing during national emergency situations, 
such as the AIDS epidemic. Since 2001, Brazil has repeatedly threatened to invoke 
compulsory licensing to reduce the price of patented ARVs. This led to substantial process 
reduction, in some cases more than half, of Merck & Co’s Stocrin/Sustiva (efavirenz) and 
Crixivan (indinavir), Roche’s Viracept (nelfinavir), Bristol-Myers Squibb’s Reyataz 
(atazanavir), Abbott’s Aluvia (lopinavir/ritonavir) and Gilead‘s Viread. Consequently, the 
government’s yearly spend on ARVs fell from $3,810 per patient in 1996 to $1,374 per 
patient in 2004, even though the number of patients rose from 8,924 to 147,500 (de Mello e 




Brazil finally issued a compulsory licence for Stocrin/Sustiva in May 2007, the first and only 
time to date that it has used the provision. However, issuing such a licence is not, as Bird 
(2008:2) says, “flipping a switch that opens the floodgates for affordable medicines”. It can 
improve access to medicines, but the process has to be managed carefully because it can 
lead to more harm. Compulsory licensing is costly as governments have to pay reasonable 
compensation to the patent holder. Negotiations can take a long time, the patent 
specification may not provide sufficient information to copy the drug, and ultimately, it may 
harm political relationships (Roffe et al, 2006:14). Although other countries have also issued 
compulsory licenses, Brazil came under international scrutiny because it was not simply 
about access to medicines, but a matter of national sovereignty. Nowhere was this clearer 
than in Brazil’s dispute with the US. 
 
Brazil’s patent legislation states that a patent holder must work the patent in Brazil, as in 
produce innovation within Brazil, to enjoy full patent protection; otherwise it could be 
subject to a compulsory licence. In January 2001, the United States Trade Representative 
launched a formal WTO trade dispute against Brazil, saying that its LPI violated TRIPS. 
According to Nunn (2008:128), this was an indirect attack on Brazil’s AIDS policy. However, 
many diplomats knew that Brazil could not win the dispute through legal discussions alone 
and sought to frame it in terms of human rights and an issue of life or death. The 
government attracted huge media attention and support from the global AIDS movement, 




Back home, the government’s power was growing in the domestic pharmaceutical market, 
cemented by the creation of a generics segment. The generics law, passed in 1999, was an 
essential component of fulfilling the requirements of the NDP by making inexpensive 
essential medicines available. At the same time, generics aimed to drive down the price of 
patented medicines and reduce government expenditure on medicines by creating 
competition in the market (Katrak, 2004:317-318). More importantly, the legislation created 
a segment that would legally have to show bioequivalence and bioavailability as innovator 
products. The focus on creating high-quality but cheaper drugs meant that the government 
could finally start reducing its dependence on drug imports, ideology that had existed since 
1971 (Bermudez, 1994:369).  
 
However, the generics law was not simply about cost reduction and greater access to 
affordable medicines, but also about regaining national control over the industry. The 
legislation has led to the emergence of a growing private and public sector specialising in 
generics, with the government being the largest purchaser of generic drugs for the public 
health system (Cohen, 2003-04:23). National drug production is also part of a wider 
industrial strategy, Complexo Industrial da Saúde (MoH, 2008), which considers 
pharmaceuticals a key sector for economic and social growth. The strategy aims to reduce 
Brazil’s pharmaceutical trade deficit and stimulate research and innovation in the private 
and public national sector. Increasing the capacity of the public laboratories and public 
vaccine manufacturers are among the key measures, to which the government has allocated 




Industrial instruments to stimulate R&D and promote the local industry can often cause 
tensions with health policies designed to improve the quality and availability of 
pharmaceuticals. Kaplan and Lang (2005:1, 21) argue that developing countries should only 
invest in local medicines production if it is more cost effective than importing 
pharmaceuticals on the open market. However, by the authors’ own admission, the value of 
local production in Brazil was “strikingly” on a par or exceeded that of certain European 
countries, making Brazil competitive beyond its national borders. Brazil’s domestic 
pharmaceuticals policies are not only putting Brazil on a more equal footing with developed 
markets, but show that the government can and is willing to play by international standards.    
 
The safety, quality and efficacy of drugs are one area where Brazil has made tremendous 
efforts to comply with international regulations. In 1999, Brazil created the Brazilian 
National Health Surveillance Agency (Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária, Anvisa) to 
regulate the quality of medicines, marking an important step forward in protecting public 
health. Anvisa was the government’s response to a series of scandals on counterfeits, which 
turned drug quality into a national issue (Piovesan and Labra, 2007:7). The government saw 
Anvisa as a way of eliminating corruption and a replacement for CEME (Central de 
Medicamentos), a supplier and producer of medicines created by the military government. 
However, CEME was considered ineffective and corrupt in its procurement methods and 
was directed towards satisfying the needs of public and private manufacturers rather than 




Anvisa was modelled on the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the European 
Medicines Agency, but has since become an important body in its own right, with strict 
procedures on registration and pricing. Anvisa has an important role in approving patents as 
a patent is only issued after the agency offers prior consent, a measure that stems from 
pipeline protection. However, its policies on pricing have created enormous friction 
between the government and the industry, both national and multinational. Brazil re-
introduced price controls around 2000-01 and in 2003, the Lula administration created 
CMED (Câmara de Regulação do Mercado de Medicamentos), housed in Anvisa, to define 
and adjust prices. Generics must be at least 35% cheaper than the innovator product. The 
price of similars must be the average price of those that already exist on the market and the 
price of new medicines must be no higher than lowest price in nine comparator countries. 
New combinations of active ingredients can be no higher than existing treatments (WTO, 
2005:5-6).  
 
Dan Gedankien (2009), the communications manager at Febrafarma, the Brazilian 
Federation of the Pharmaceutical industry, which represents both MPCs and national 
companies, said that price controls have negatively affected the introduction of new drugs. 
New medicines were introduced in Brazil on average about two years after Mexico, which 
has no price controls. Moreover, if the reason behind price controls is to offer medicines at 
lower prices, it was failing as prices of older medicines had stayed the same, he said. 
However, Bruno Abreu (2009), head of Anvisa’s monitoring market office, maintained that 




On the surface, MPCs appear to be losing power at the hands of a growing national industry 
and an activist state, with considerable international leverage. The government’s policies 
have certainly created competition for MPCs, but MPCs still have an important role to play 
in Brazil’s pharmaceutical market. Generics may help to expand the sector, but they cannot 
meet all the medical needs of the population, given the wide range of diseases affecting 
Brazil. It needs innovative medicines more than ever before, particularly in an era where 
citizens are becoming more aware of their rights as patients and consumers. With or 
without TRIPS, Brazil needs products that are tailored to the specific needs of its population 
and in many cases, only MPCs can provide that service. Brazil may be a key market for MPCs 




Chapter 3  
 
The rapid growth of generic medicines has had a strong impact on the opportunities 
available for MPC participation in Brazil’s pharmaceutical market. The public and private 
generics sectors are expanding their activities to include research into new products, an 
activity that had traditionally been the domain of MPCs. However, generics alone cannot 
meet all the medical needs of the population and especially for diseases that require new 
types of drugs. Therefore, MPC participation in Brazil’s pharmaceutical sector remains 
crucial for its development. However, given the recent changes, MPCs have to adapt their 
politics if they are to be valuable but also unique partners (Woll and Artigas, 2007:126).    
 
This chapter will assess how MPCs can expand in Brazil by pursuing dual policies of 
differentiation and consensus. MPCs’ ability to differentiate themselves from their 
competitors is core to their global strategy, and Brazil is no different. Contrary to 
stereotypes, competitors in developing countries are acquiring more know-how as they seek 
increasingly sophisticated technology (Lister, 2004:2). At the same time, co-operation on 
other issues will allow MPCs to expand their footprint in areas where they have a low 
presence. MPCs have to adapt their models designed for Western markets to the realities of 
the Brazilian market, but they should be clear and transparent about their strategy. This will 
not only help MPCs to focus their activities, but give a better indicator to investors who 




MPCs account for about 70% of Brazil’s pharmaceutical sector, but it is highly fragmented 
(Homedes et al, 2005:6). In the past few years, domestic firms have been growing much 
more rapidly and are increasing their market share. In 2006, EMS, a domestic 
pharmaceutical company, overtook France’s Sanofi-Aventis to become the top-ranking 
pharmaceutical company by revenue. In 2007, according to IMS, EMS’s sales rose by 29.4% 
to R$1.42 billion, while those of Sanofi-Aventis grew by just 7.3% to R$1.27 billion. Sales of 
the five leading players, except for Ache Labs, grew by double-digit figures and they now 
account for just under a quarter of total retail pharmaceutical sales. By contrast, sales of the 
top five MPCs were limited to single-digit growth, with Bayer and Pfizer posting sales 
declines of 0.6% and 1.8% respectively (IMS, 2008). 
 
Brazil’s pharmaceutical market consists of three main types of medicines: innovative or 
reference patent-protected medicines, generics and similars, often referred to as “branded 
generics” as they are sold under a brand name. Pharmacists can substitute original brands 
for generics but not with similars. In the SUS, doctors must prescribe medicines by their 
international non-proprietary name and generic names must be printed on product packs, 
and packaging must display a yellow stripe and capital G.  
 
Odnir Finotti (2009), president of ProGenericos, Brazil’s generics industry association, says 
that generics account for about 20% of Brazil’s total pharmaceutical market and should 
eventually increase their share to about a third. Affordability is a key reason behind the 
growth of generics, particularly as most people pay for drugs out-of-pocket. However, there 
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is a wide disparity in pricing even among some generics. Data from the CRF-DF (de Oliveira, 
2009), the regional council of pharmacists that audits dispensing in Brasilia, showed that 
between November and December 2008, the price of the antibacterial ciprofloxacin ranged 
from R$33.96 to R$92.40. Similarly, the price of amoxicillin varied from R$8.70 to R$23.37. 
This means that consumers could pay almost three times more for the same product 
depending on a doctor’s prescribing or the pharmacist’s dispensing preferences.  
 
Moreover, generics are not always the cheapest medicines; similars usually tend to be the 
lowest in price. However, there is still great confusion between generics and similars. In a 
survey of 3,182 people, the first population-based study investigating the knowledge and 
utilisation of generic drugs in Brazil, the majority of interviewees were knowledgeable about 
the pricing and quality of generics. However, almost half of respondents incorrectly 
classified a similar as a generic (Bertoldi, 2005:1810).  
 
Many consider similars inferior drugs. Although they have the same APIs as original 
medicines, they currently do not have to meet the same standards as generics. However, 
similars will have to show bioequivalence by 2013. Carlos Alexandre Geyer (2009), president 
of Alanac, which represents national companies, has defended the use of generics. He says 
that without them, the government would be unable to have such an extensive programme 
of free and widely available pharmaceuticals. Of around 11,000 medicines registered with 
Anvisa, almost 8,000 are similars. In some cases, doctors are more familiar with a similar 
than the product for which it is a reference, Mr Geyer says. Therefore, if price is the main 
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determinant in choosing a medicine and the government wants to expand access to drugs, 
similars will remain an important part of the market for the foreseeable future.  
 
The continued importance of similars and the rise in generics is empowering national 
companies to branch out into new areas, particularly research. Marcelo Liebhardt (2009), 
head of economic affairs at Interfarma, said that national generics companies had “muscled 
up” and were ready to enter other areas, particularly incremental innovation. For example, 
EMS (2009) has the largest number of sales reps in Brazil, with a team of 1,500 people who 
make around five million visits to doctors, the company says. The entrance of generic 
companies in research and innovation is blurring the boundaries that used to distinguish 
MPCs from domestic companies (da Silva and Oliveira, 2007:74).  
 
 
Innovation is the main area where MPCs can usually differentiate themselves from domestic 
players. In recent years, the global decline in genuinely innovative products from MPCs is 
narrowing the gap between them and generics manufacturers in Brazil, as they both look 
towards incremental innovation. Many national companies and governmental institutions 
argue that MPCs have unjustly benefited from the LPI’s acceptance of second-use and 
polymorph patents, which extend the protection of already known products. A bill to 
eliminate the use of second-use and polymorph patents, supported by the MoH and Anvisa, 
has passed a first round debate in Congress. However, Jorge Raimundo, president of 
Interfarma’s advisory board, said that second-use patents were “the most common patents 
in the world”, therefore banning them could lead to a significant loss of investment from 
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MPCs. Moreover, it would remove an important incentive for domestic firms to conduct 
their own R&D (Bruce, 7-7-2009).  
 
However, although the public market is well served by generics manufacturers, there is a 
large market that cannot be fulfilled by off-patent drugs alone, as Brazil still urgently 
requires new drugs. In the short-term, MPCs need to differentiate themselves by continuing 
to and speeding up the introduction of new medicines already approved in Europe and the 
US. In May, GlaxoSmithKline (Hussain, 6-5-2009) launched in Brazil two new products 
already licensed in other major markets and plans to launch another nine or so within the 
next two to three years.  
 
Targeting the rights types of medicines to the right customers and doctors is another 
important strategy for MPCs. Rubens Pedrosa (2009), president of AstraZeneca (UK) in 
Brazil, said that sustained growth of Brazil’s GDP had triggered greater social mobility, 
creating 15-20 million new customers who want more sophisticated and segmented 
products. AstraZeneca’s portfolio in Brazil will be based on global brands such as the 
cholesterol lowering drug Crestor (rosuvastatin) and Seroquel (quetiapine fumarate), 
indicated for bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. However, selling mature brands that are 
no longer patent-protected in Brazil, such as the cardiovascular drug Atenol (atenolol; also 
sold as Tenormin, Tenormine and Prenormine) or the hospital-antibiotic Meronem (also sold 
as Merrem) are also part of the company’s strategy. Mr Pedrosa said that these drugs still 
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made significant volume sales and were important for markets such as Brazil, where 
branding remains an important asset.   
 
Meanwhile, other MPCs are seeking to deliver innovation by diversifying their portfolio in 
Brazil, a strategy that is also part of a wider trend within the global industry. For example, 
over-the-counter (OTC) medicines are a strong pillar of Swiss-based Nycomed’s strategy 
globally and for Brazil, in addition to its innovative, prescription medicines line. Nycomed’s 
Neosaldina (dipyrone and isometheptene), for headache relief, was the sixth leading brand 
in Brazil in 2007, based on the retail market at ex-manufacturer prices, with sales growing 
by 19.6% to R$129.8 million. Sanofi-Aventis’s OTC Dorflex (dipyrone and orphenadrine), a 
muscle relaxant launched more than 30 years ago, was the number one product in Brazil in 
2007, with sales rising by 11.4% to R$172.3 million (IMS, 2009).  
 
Product differentiation is key for MPCs. According to Luiz Eduardo Violland (2009), head of 
Nycomed Brazil, competitors were very aggressive in offering high discounts to pharmacies 
and drugstores. Therefore, relationships with pharmacies and drugstores were critical in 
surviving this competitive market, he said. Nycomed plans to expand its workforce, 
including commercial support staff, as prescribing and dispensing require entirely different 
sales teams. 
  
However, differentiation alone will not guarantee MPC expansion in Brazil. In many 
developing countries, the pharmaceutical industry is often perceived to be exploiting poor 
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communities through dishonest practices in pricing and the promotion of medicines, in a bid 
to maximise its profits. Lexchin (1996:1) says that the prices of medicines in some 
developing companies have risen by 400-500%. With greater attention focused on the 
industry by the media and civil society, MPCs will be keen to improve their image to show 
that they are ethical and responsible actors. In the aftermath of the AIDS epidemics, MPCs’ 
pricing policies have come under renewed attack by civil groups. National organisations 
formed alliances with transnational groups, using the “boomerang effect” (Keck and Sikkink, 
1999:12) to pressure the government to take action and challenge MPCs on their pricing 
policies.  
 
The government’s bargaining on pricing has helped to reduce its pharmaceutical budget, but 
it has also showed that it could gain the upper hand with MPCs. Manufacturers of high-
cost/exceptional medicines are obliged to give a 25% discount on the entry price, a measure 
known as CAP. In June, Anvisa (www.anvisa.gov.br, 2009) announced that it would intensify 
the monitoring of CAP after it found that manufacturers and distributors in several states 
were failing to comply with the regulation. As seen from the previous chapter high prices 
can trigger Brazil issuing a compulsory licence.  
 
In pricing negotiations for AIDS, Cohen and Lybecker (2005:219) show that a MPC may move 
first and offer a minimal or deep discount. The MPC would prefer to offer a minimal 
discount over a deep discount but it would also prefer a deep discount over a compulsory 
licence. Although MPCs have reduced the prices of AIDS medicines, prices for other 
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medicines in Brazil remain high. A comparison of retail prices of 132 essential drugs 
between Sweden and Brazil found that overall prices in Brazil were 1.9 times higher than in 
Sweden. Even widely used drugs with multiple manufacturers, such as paracetamol and 
mebendazol, had retail prices 50 times higher than the international bulk price. This 
suggests that these drugs reach consumers at prices far above the cost of production 
(Nóbrega et al, 2007:120-121).  
 
Many MPCs are adopting tiered pricing to make prices in developing countries more 
equitable. Danzon and Towse (2003:184) argue that under well-designed differential pricing, 
prices in affluent markets exceed the marginal cost of production and distribution by 
enough to cover the joint costs of R&D. This balances out lower prices in developing 
countries and still preserves incentives for R&D.  GSK (4-8-2009) is offering a tiered-pricing 
policy for its new H1N1 pandemic flu vaccine and has allocated 20% of its manufacturing 
site to developing countries from September onwards. A competitive bidding process could 
also create more appropriate pricing in Brazil. In 2003, MPCs and generics entered a region-
wide competition in Latin America to reduce the cost of AIDS medicines. Having established 
a base bid price for the region, the successful bidders (generics manufacturers and one 
MPC) negotiated with each nation. The competition resulted in reduced prices for generic 





Pricing is just one area that will improve MPCs’ image; medicines promotion and working 
within the confines of Brazil’s national legislation are equally important. A report on new 
trends in drug promotion in the late 1990s found that the “worst excesses of misleading and 
unethical drug promotion” continued to occur in developing countries (Mintzes, 1998:1). 
This is particularly worrying if promotional activities of MPCs are the main source of 
information for the medical community. In the early 1990s, MPCs in Brazil spent 28% of 
their sales on promotion, the largest share of a sample of seven developing countries across 
the world (Lexchin, 1992:9,12).  
 
Educating health professionals and the public about the safe use of medicines is crucial, but 
prescribers and users cannot review all the available information on pharmaceuticals. 
Therefore, comprehensive national legislation governing drug promotion to ensure its 
safety, quality and efficacy is needed (Homedes et al, 2005:697). However, sometimes, the 
problem lies with the legislation itself rather than the industry. Nascimento (2009:869,872) 
argues that legislation in place between 2000 and 2009, the Collegiate Board Resolution 
(RDC) 102/2000 published by Anvisa, was too weak, particularly in terms of punishment, to 
prevent irregularities in advertising. For example, in 2004, Anvisa issued 222 fines totalling 
R$6.3 million. However, in 2006, the industry spent R$978.9 million on marketing alone. In 
June 2009, Anvisa replaced 102/2000 with Resolution 96/08, which includes stricter rules on 
the promotion of OTCs and bans gifts to doctors, pharmacists and the public (Barreto 
Ferreira, Kujawski, Brancher e Gonçalves, 2009). Several MPCs and national firms believe it 
is too extensive and are trying to reverse some of the provisions (Violland, 2009).  
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The registration of medicines is another area where MPCs are not above the law and have 
to show a commitment to work with national authorities. One multinational pharmaceutical 
executive who wished to remain unnamed said that Anvisa favoured the registration of 
generics by domestic companies over innovative products by MPCs. In 2003, it took on 
average 12-14 months to register a new medicine, costing $2,700-27,000 depending on the 
size of the manufacturer, and eight to 12 months for a similar and cost $7,000. Generics 
have an accelerated registration process of six to eight months and cost $2,000 (Homedes et 
al, 2005:5).  
 
Mr Finotti said that the timeframe in Brazil was similar to other major countries, and Anvisa 
treated national companies no differently to MPCs. Jorge Samaha (2009), head of the 
evaluation of safety and efficacy of drugs at Anvisa, said that MPCs shared some of the 
responsibility for the delays. In some cases they just submitted a summary of the trial data 
even though Anvisa required the complete data. Many companies hoped that Anvisa would 
approve the drug simply because it had been approved by the US FDA, he added. However, 
in general, MPCs respected and followed the criteria in Brazil, Mr Samaha said. Anvisa plans 
to recruit more staff within the next few years to increase internal capacity for reviewing 
trial data and speeding up the registration process.  
 
In other areas MPCs have taken the initiative in working with the legislation. In February, 
Anvisa introduced a new resolution on pharmacovigilance, RDC No.4, to strengthen the 
notification and analysis of adverse affects of drugs already on the market. Many MPCs 
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already have a pharmacovigilance department, but the new legislation outlines for the first 
time the procedures and responsibilities that companies must undertake in 
pharmacovigilance. This is an important step in advancing the production and registration of 
medicines because pharmacovigilance is an essential component of a quality assurance 
system (Cohen, 2000:20). In response to the legislation Bayer is one the first MPCs that plan 
to increase the capacity of its pharmacovigilance unit in Brazil. Horstfried Läpple, head of 
Bayer Brazil, said in an interview with Gazeta Mercantil, that 37 people were currently 
involved in the project, and by 2010, the programme should have more than 100 people 
(Franca, 18-02-2009).        
 
The above initiatives show that not only are MPCs becoming more pro-active about working 
within Brazil’s pharmaceutical framework, but also highlight another strand in their policy: 
co-operation. Angela Fan Chi Kung (2009), partner of the lifesciences team at the law firm 
Pinheiro Neto, said that in the beginning, when the generics law came into effect, things 
were difficult between domestic companies and multinationals. However, the two sides are 
now co-existing well. Both national and multinational companies agree that there should be 
more cooperation between the two segments, particularly in the form of research 
partnerships to improve market access.    
 
Domestic producers, public and private, have shown that they can quickly become a key 
part of innovation in Brazil. In vaccines for example, the Butantan Institute, tied to the 
secretary of health of the State of São Paulo, produced 588.6 million doses of different 
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vaccines between 2003 and 2006 using technology developed in-house. It manufactures 
about 80% of domestic human vaccine antigens in Brazil and has recently built a production 
facility for influenza vaccine in an attempt to reduce the country’s dependence on imports 
(Rezaie et al, 2008:2). Furthermore, several domestic companies are exporting their 
products abroad as they too become international players. EMS was the first domestic 
company to enter Europe, forming a joint venture with Germed in Portugal.  
 
However, domestic companies and public laboratories still lack the skills, technology and 
research capacity of MPCs. For example, Far-Manguinhos, a public laboratory, has been 
instrumental in developing the government’s AIDS programmes. It has not only produced 
cheap ARVs, but has also helped to contribute to local knowledge by using reverse 
engineering techniques to produce versions of ARVs not protected under TRIPS. However, 
this industrialisation process has reached “a major stumbling block” because the number of 
domestic firms that are able to receive and implement the technologies is limited (Cassier 
and Correa, 2003:104). Furthermore, there will always be a need for new AIDS drugs, ones 
that generic manufacturers are unable to produce, because patients develop immunity and 
treatment regimes need adjustment (Shadlen, 2007:565).  
 
Technology transfers through research partnerships between domestic players and MPCs is 
one way of harnessing innovation. TRIPS explicitly states that patent holders should transfer 
and disseminate technology as a means of improving social and economic welfare. 
However, there is little information on the best strategies to achieve and speed up 
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technology transfers (Rovira, 2006:235). In May 2008 the MoH published a list of 57 
pharmaceutical APIs that were considered of strategic interest to the public healthcare 
sector in Brazil, spanning from ARVs to biologics to address diseases like multiple sclerosis. 
The aim is to improve access by reducing overall costs and to decrease Brazilian dependence 
on drug imports. During the first quarter of 2009 the MoH announced that 10 public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) were already in place, involving Brazilian API manufacturers, local 
companies, MPCs and public institutions. According to Mr Pedrosa (2009), PPPs have the 
potential to give pharmaceutical companies, MPCs and national ones, more 
opportunities to participate in the public sector and broader market access. And for local 
companies, PPPs are a way of developing their model and technology, enabling them to 
move away from a pure generics strategy. 
 
 Mr Raimundo (2009) said that if MPCs failed to transfer technology, the public laboratories 
would simply get the medicines or technology from elsewhere. MPCs would rather have a 
good relationship with the government than conflict, he added. For example, GSK (17-8-
2009) signed a research and development collaboration with Brazil’s Oswaldo Cruz 
Foundation (Fiocruz) this August to develop a vaccine for dengue fever. GSK will also give 
Fiocruz access to Synflorix, GSK’s 10-valent conjugate vaccine for paediatric pneumococcal 
disease. Elsewhere, Genzyme (11-12-2008) has had research collaboration with Fiocruz 
since 2007 to develop treatments for neglected diseases, focusing initially on Chagas 
disease. This is part of its Humanitarian Assistance for Neglected Diseases initiative, for 




Co-operation in technology transfer, particularly for neglected diseases, puts MPCs in a new 
light. An examination of more than 60 neglected-disease projects showed that commercial 
motives for re-entering the field were largely irrelevant. Instead, the decision stemmed from 
longer-term factors including corporate social responsibility, improving the industry’s public 
image and a way of expanding in developing markets. Moran (2005:3-4) says this partnering 
model enables MPCs to participate in neglected-disease research while still protecting 
shareholder value and they can manufacture and distribute the product at no mark-up. This 
means that the public sector will benefit from MPCs’ knowledge and patients will obtain 
medicines at not-for-profit prices.  
 
Although MPCs will continue to focus on innovation, some companies are starting to see 
opportunities beyond their traditional sectors, most notably in generics. Earlier this year, 
Sanofi-Aventis, which is already in a strong position in Brazil, became the first MPC to enter 
the generics segment in Brazil through the acquisition of Medley, one of Brazil’s leading 
generics companies. The move into generics is part of the MPC global strategy to diversify 
its business. The model is starting to trickle down to Brazil, as firms realise that they have to 
act in local markets if they want to maintain their position. Local media reported this 
September that Pfizer plans to buy the national company NeoQuimica for $525 million 
(Parra-Bernal, 2-9-2009).  
 
But at the same time, just because Brazil has a strong generics market does not mean that 
MPCs should necessarily enter the generics segment. For example, Bayer has said at the 
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global level that it will not enter the generics markets, even in emerging markets, because it 
believes that generics do not create value (Shah, 5-3-09). The opportunities for each MPC 
will be different and it is important that they carve out their own strategy.  
 
Conversely, the government also needs to attract MPCs if it is serious about improving 
access to medicines, especially in under-served areas. The consumption of pharmaceuticals 
is mainly concentrated in the states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Cohen suggests that 
the government could create incentives for the private sector to assume a greater role in 
drug supply and distribution in under-served areas (Cohen, 2000:13). Novartis is going one 
step further and has decided to build a vaccines facility in partnership with the state of 
Pernambuco.  
 
Andrin Oswald (2009), head of Novartis’s vaccines and diagnostics division, said that Brazil 
was chosen over Italy and Singapore because it was a significant regional and global market 
in which Novartis wanted a local presence. National laboratories are already present in 
Pernambuco, but Novartis will be one the first MPCs there. Mr Oswald said the plant would 
create greater access to medicines as manufacturing would be cheaper in Brazil than in 
Europe and the government is financing some of the production. In addition, he said that 
building infrastructure was a better alternative to technology transfer as it would allow 




Initially, the opportunities for MPCs in Brazil seemed limited, confronted with an innovative 
generics sector and exacerbated by global industry challenges. However, MPCs are rising to 
the challenge on both fronts, by adapting their business model for Brazil but also reaching a 
level of maturity in its relations with domestic companies. The persistent need for new 
treatments means that MPCs will always have an important role in Brazil’s pharmaceutical 
market. Yet in recent years, they are going beyond conventional ideology to explore 
opportunities in areas that would have seemed unimaginable previously, be it through 
differentiation or consensus. And in years to come, the boundaries between multinational 
and national companies will change again to create a new paradigm in Brazil’s 








As MPCs seek to diversify their business model and expand in emerging markets to boost 
sales, Brazil will be more important to them than ever before. At the same time, Brazil’s 
domestic pharmaceutical policies continue to rely on MPCs to increase market access by 
developing and supplying new treatments. In recent years, MPCs have become important 
political actors with significant influence on pharmaceutical policies, but so too have the 
state and domestic players. Therefore, the politics of MPCs in Brazil are being shaped not 
only by the pharmaceutical framework, but also by the broader political and socio-economic 
context. 
 
With the advent of globalisation and a transnationalisation of the healthcare sector, some 
commentators have raised an important question about how far health sectors are being 
reshaped around the requirements of MPCs (Abel and Lloyd-Sherlock, 2000:7). From the 
1970s onwards, this became a real concern in Brazil, after healthcare became increasingly 
privatised, and MPCs came to dominate the pharmaceutical market specifically. The military 
government made strong efforts to develop a domestic industry, and succeeded to a large 
extent by allowing national companies to make copies of innovator drugs. However, the 
creation of a national industry was more the result of an inward-looking nationalist 
industrial policy rather than a genuine regard for increasing access to medicines, given that 
most people were excluded from pharmaceutical services. MPCs faced relatively little 





Democratisation heralded a profound shift in the ideology governing healthcare and 
pharmaceuticals as the government enacted reforms based on free and universal access to 
services. Several authors argue that democratisation does not intrinsically lead to better 
health. Lobato and Burlandy (2000:19) say that Brazilian healthcare reform was much more 
evident in the political sphere by democratising services rather than in terms of improving 
health indicators. This may be true, but many other factors, including violence and poverty, 
influence health indicators. Besides, health indicators will improve only after services that 
can adequately respond to the needs of the population are in place.  
 
Democratisation was crucial not only in terms of modernising an ailing healthcare system, 
but also in establishing a framework for instituting these changes. Nowhere was this more 
evident than in pharmaceutical policy. Reforming pharmaceutical policy is one of the key 
challenges of the SUS because many people do not have access to pharmaceuticals in the 
first instance. In 2000, it was estimated that 70 million people, about 41% of the population, 
did not have access to drugs (Vieira and Zucchi, 2007:2). Through the NDP, the government 
laid the groundwork for guaranteeing universal access to essential medicines that were safe, 
effective and of high quality. Importantly, the NDP created a regulatory and legislative 
framework for the provision of pharmaceuticals, but also for strengthening the leadership of 
the government and influencing the actions of other actors (Backman et al, 2008:1685). 
Cost containment of medicines is a central feature of the NDP, thus creating an impetus for 
strengthening the public sector and the local production of medicines. Although the 
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government has become the largest purchaser of low-cost medicines, in most instances it is 
also the only purchaser of new, high-cost medicines. This has put MPCs under some 
pressure to reduce their prices, such as the mandatory 25% discount on the price of new 
medicines entering the Brazilian market. Yet for the first time, MPCs had to act within a 
specific framework that sought to makes medicines affordable and accessible in different 
geographical regions. Within this framework, the introduction of TRIPS and the legislation 
on generics brought the politics of MPCs to the fore.  
 
As seen in chapter 2, TRIPS was a major achievement for MPCs as Brazil implemented TRIPS-
plus legislation concerning patents on pharmaceuticals. However, according to Cohen 
(2006:15), Brazil stands out for its approach towards ensuring access to essential medicines, 
most notably for ARVs, while meeting international obligations. Brazil set about 
counterbalancing the favourable provisions to MPCs through its particular interpretation of 
the law. These included the clause saying that MPCs had to work a patent in Brazil and 
taking advantage of TRIPS-flexibilities, particularly compulsory licensing of patented ARVs. 
Although the government has not always succeeded in reducing prices of new ARVs, MPCs 
are reluctant to be at loggerheads with the government because of the politicisation of 
AIDS. Moreover, following the generics legislation, MPCs have to tread carefully because 
they know that Brazil has strong capacity for local production.  
 
Brazil has shown that it is more than capable of producing drugs to international standards, 
as illustrated by the regulatory agency Anvisa. Although national and multinational 
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companies constantly criticise its policies on price controls and MPCs claim it is too slow in 
registering new medicines, Anvisa is another sign of Brazil’s growing professionalisation in 
the domestic and international pharmaceutical sector. Anvisa may have been modelled on 
the US FDA but it has created its own rules on medicines registration and has become 
admired globally for its strict but fair standards (Flynn and de Oliveira, 2009:17). With the 
government’s active involvement in the sector and the rise of national companies, it would 
initially appear that such policies have created deep tension between MPCs and domestic 
players. 
 
At the start, this dissertation stated that it would assess the nature of the relationship 
between MPCs and domestic companies. Although there is friction between the two on 
certain issues, notably patent protection and the extension of patent rights, the generics 
sector has created a new dynamic in terms of supply and pricing. On the whole, MPCs and 
domestic companies co-exist well because they are two parts of one strategy that can 
provide broader opportunities for market access to medicines. Mr Raimundo (2009) said 
that Brazil’s generics legislation was very good, with generics companies developing high-
quality products based on good technology and raw materials. MPCs have acknowledged 
the value of generics, as many national companies move away from a traditional generics 
model towards innovation of their own. As a result, some MPCs are acquiring leading 




The acquisition of generics companies is part of the evolving relationship between MPCs 
and domestic players. Moreover, adding generics to their portfolio is another way in which 
MPCs can provide value as innovation slows down, with the “golden age” in drug discovery 
(19 Gereffi, 1983:248) a thing of the past. However, MPCs have an opportunity to launch 
innovative products already licensed in other major markets as more and more patients 
exercise their civil rights and demand access to these medicines. On the one hand, the 
judicialisation of healthcare can reinforce inequalities by giving priority to consumers who 
have the resources to take their complaints to the courts (Gloppen, 2008:24). On the other 
hand, however, it shows that the need for and access to innovative drugs remains a major 
problem in Brazil.  
 
In 2006, the MoH launched the National Policy for Primary Care Provision to tackle some of 
the most prevalent diseases in Brazil. It included the elimination of Hansen’s disease and the 
control of tuberculosis (TB), arterial hypertension and diabetes. An analysis of new drugs 
approved from 2000-04 showed that although 49,366 new cases of Hansen’s disease were 
registered in 2004, no new drug was registered for its treatment. About 80,515 cases of TB 
were reported in the same year, but only two drugs were registered for treatment (Vidotti, 
et al, 2008;39). Novartis’s decision to build a vaccines facility in Pernambuco could prompt 
other companies to expand into other parts of the country, and perhaps new therapeutic 
areas to help extend market access in poorer states. Moreover, the government support is 
not limited to domestic companies; Brazil’s development bank BNDES is helping to finance 




MPCs concede that they losing market share to domestic companies, but this has prompted 
them to seek new ways of doing what they do best: innovation. For now, the balance of 
power may be shifting towards domestic companies, but as this paper shows, power is far 
from static. A robust generics sector is dependent on a strong innovative sector. Therefore, 
if MPCs fail to deliver on their expansion strategy in Brazil, innovation from domestic 
companies will only be as good as their predecessors. Brazil is to hold elections next year, 
and although there may be a change in government, many believe that there will be little 
change in the pharmaceutical sector. As Mr Finotti (2009) says, “It’s about evolution, not 
revolution.” Similarly, MPCs are keen to evolve their expansion strategy in Brazil, but as 
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